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Abstract
Drawing an analogy between modal structuralism about mathematics
and theism, I offer a structuralist account that implicitly defines theism in
terms of three basic relations: logical and metaphysical priority, and epis-
temic superiority. On this view, statements like ‘God is omniscient’ have
a hypothetical and a categorical component. The hypothetical component
provides a translation pattern according to which statements in theistic
language are converted into statements of second-order modal logic. The
categorical component asserts the logical possibility of the theism struc-
ture on the basis of uncontroversial facts about the physical world. This
structuralist reading of theism preserves objective truth-values for theistic
statements while remaining neutral on the question of ontology. Thus, it
offers a way of understanding theism to which a naturalist cannot object,
and it accommodates the fact that religious belief, for many theists, is an
essentially relational matter.1
1 Introduction
Theism is not popular among philosophers.2 There are a number of reasons for
this, but the most important one is certainly that the empirical sciences have
taken over many of the explanatory roles that used to be fulfilled by the con-
cept of God. Assuming the existence of an all-knowing and all-powerful being
is no longer needed in order to explain nature in all its complexity: physics,
astronomy, chemistry, meteorology, biology, and so forth offer not only expla-
nations for the vast majority of observable phenomena, but also theories and
models that allow their precise prediction. Naturalism is the philosophical po-
sition that pays homage to this stunning success of the sciences by considering
only those philosophical positions viable that are, in some vaguely defined sense,
‘consistent’ with them.
1This article is forthcoming in Fiona Ellis, New Models of Religious Understanding, Oxford
University Press.
2Not so among non-philosophers: According to the Encyclopaedia Britannica, only 2% of
the world’s population self-identify as atheists, a figure that decreased on average by 0.17%
per year between 2000 and 2010. Source: https://www.britannica.com/topic/religion-Year-
In-Review-2010/Worldwide-Adherents-of-All-Religions . However, the distribution of theism
and atheism differs, of course, from country to country. According to the Global Index of Re-
ligion and Atheism, atheists are in the majority, for example, in Scandinavia, Germany, and
China, whereas in almost all African countries, less than 10% of the population self-identify as
atheists. Source: https://web.archive.org/web/20121016062403/http://redcresearch.ie/wp-
content/uploads/2012/08/RED-C-press-release-Religion-and-Atheism-25-7-12.pdf
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It is easy to see why traditional monotheistic interpretations of theism appear
to be in tension with the natural sciences: the properties classically ascribed to
God are incompatible with the scientifically defined preconditions for having
such properties. For example, biological, neurological, and medical evidence
seems to indicate very clearly that consciousness, identity, and person-hood
require some kind of underlying physical structure, which stands in contradiction
to the classical interpretation of God as an immaterial yet conscious person.
Also the idea of a being that exerts causal influence on the physical world (for
example by performing miracles that breach the laws of nature) without being
physical itself is scientifically hard to maintain, and has only minimal appeal in
light of the science’s “extraordinarily rich explanatory structure, worked out in
the crucible of a rigorously constrained methodology, and meticulously tested
against a formidable range of observational evidence.”3
However, more than one conclusion can be drawn from the apparent incom-
patibility of science with classical interpretations of God and theism. The first
one is to reject theism; but this is an unacceptable route for theists. The second
one is to reject naturalism; but this is an unacceptable route for many philoso-
phers. A third one is to argue for an interpretation of naturalism that doesn’t
preclude theism.4 A fourth one is to argue for an interpretation of theism that
doesn’t preclude naturalism. This is the route I explore in this paper.
I argue that we need to develop new ways of theorizing about God and the-
ism that are compatible with naturalism,5 and I demonstrate what such a way
could look like. Drawing an analogy between mathematical realism and the-
ism, I offer an account that treats God like modal structuralists treat numbers.
More precisely, I argue that, rather than trying to settle questions of ontology,
theists should focus on the structural relations that define theistic belief (such
as the logical priority relation implicit in theistic concepts like ‘sin’, ‘revela-
tion’, or ‘prophet’; the metaphysical priority relation implicit in the story of
divine creation and in characterizations of God as omnipotent; and the epis-
temic priority relation implicit in characterizations of God as omniscient), and
on the preservation of objective truth-values for theistic statements. Preserving
objective truth-values is crucial for the theist in order to avoid a whole range
of undesirable interpretations of theistic discourse, such as non-cognitivism (ac-
cording to which theistic statements do not express genuine propositions at all);
error-theory (according to which theistic statements do express genuine, though
universally false, propositions); and subjectivism (according to which the truth-
values of theistic statements are determined by the attitudes or conventions of
religious people). A structuralist reading of theism achieves exactly that: it
preserves objective truth-values for theistic statements while remaining neutral
on the question of ontology.
3John Cottingham, ‘Transcending Science’, this volume.
4This strategy has recently been defended by Fiona Ellis in her God, Value, and Nature
(OUP, 2014). She argues that (a) there is a way to expand philosophical naturalism in such a
way that it becomes compatible with theism, and that (b) this way is already implicit in the
concept of a particular reading of naturalism.
5There are different forms of naturalism. ‘Scientific naturalists’ are convinced that every
aspect of reality can be explained by the methods of the natural sciences. ‘Expansive natu-
ralists’ concede that there are aspects of reality, such as human values and moral facts, which
cannot be understood in terms of physical facts alone. See Ellis 2015 for a detailed discussion
of these different kinds of naturalism, and their respective ability to accommodate theism.
My account is compatible with all forms of naturalism.
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Cashing out theism in structuralist terms may not accommodate everything
the theist was hoping for. In particular, my account doesn’t offer an argument
for the existence of God, but only for the possibility of the existence of God as
characterized by our relations with him. I think that showing the possibility
of God’s existence may be the best thing a theist can hope for. However, I
don’t think that this is a trivial result at all. To the contrary, it constitutes
a straightforward refutation of the view, implicit in most forms of naturalism,
that scientific evidence seems to imply the impossibility of the existence of
God. Arguing for the possibility of God’s existence and objective truth-values
for theistic statements in entirely naturalistic terms constitutes a genuine step
forward, towards an interpretation of theism that is compatible with naturalism.
Moreover, due to its ontological neutrality, a structuralist account of theism
provides a discursive basis for the theism—atheism debate, thus enabling a
discourse that would otherwise be impossible. As a consequence, it allows theism
to reclaim centre-stage in the philosophical arena.
2 Companions in Guilt
Mathematical realists and theists are companions in guilt. Their guilt consists in
a stubborn conviction of the existence of entities E with the following properties:
1. E’s are not spatiotemporal
2. E’s exist independently of our minds and language
3. empirical science neither implies the existence nor the non-existence of E’s
4. statements about E’s have truth-conditions and truth-values
5. truths about E’s are objectively true
6. truths about E’s are not reducible to truths about something else
7. it is possible for us human beings to attain truths about E’s.
Mathematical realists believe in many such entities: numbers, sets, functions,
and so forth. Theists believe in only one—God. Since it seems much more
difficult to explain and justify belief in the existence of entities like E than in,
say, tables, chairs, and beer mugs, mathematical realists and theists also face
identical philosophical problems: first, how to explain the ontology of E’s and
thus, the semantics of E-truths, and second, how to account for our knowledge
of E-truths.
For theists, investigating the ontology of God means trying to figure out the
fundamental properties of God (omniscience? omnipotence? immateriality?).
For mathematical realists, investigating the ontology of mathematics means try-
ing to figure out the fundamental properties of numbers and other mathematical
objects (are they best characterized in terms of sets? categories? structures?).
Each of the many ontological stories we can tell about what numbers really
are, and what God really is, then gives rise to a corresponding epistemological
question: how do we acquire knowledge, on this or that particular ontological
reading, of the truths about God and mathematical objects respectively?
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These are difficult questions, and so it is not surprising that, just like there is
a great deal of disagreement among theists, there is a great deal of disagreement
between mathematical realists. As John Bell and Geoffrey Hellman, two eminent
philosophers of mathematics, put it:
“Contrary to the popular (mis)conception of mathematics as a cut-
and-dried body of universally agreed-on truths and methods, as soon
as one examines the foundations of mathematics, one encounters
divergences of viewpoint and failures of communication that can
easily remind one of religious, schismatic controversy.” (Bell and
Hellman 2006: 64)
For example, just like theists disagree on how God is best characterized,
and consequently, what the fundamental truths about God are, mathematicians
disagree on what the correct way of axiomatizing set theory is (with or without
the Axiom of Choice, the Axiom of Regularity, and higher-cardinal extensions?);
whether set theory or category theory is the ultimate foundation of mathematics;
and what the correct logical rules for mathematical proofs are.6 Since it is not
clear that disagreements like these will be ever be settled conclusively, it would
be a problem if our evaluations of mathematical realism and theism respectively
depended on agreement about questions of ontology. Fortunately, however, they
don’t.
In the philosophy of mathematics, adopting a structuralist view of math-
ematics has become a popular way of avoiding entanglement in ontological
questions, while at the same time preserving what the mathematician is most
concerned about, namely, (1) definite truth-values for mathematical statements
combined with (2) a plausible story for how mathematical knowledge is possible.
In the following, I will briefly explain the core points and merits of a structural-
ist philosophy of mathematics. I will then outline what a structuralist approach
to theism could look like, and what the merits of such an account would be.
3 A Structuralist View of Mathematics
Structuralist positions in the philosophy of mathematics emerged in the second
half of the 20th century as a way to offer a middle-ground between Platonist
(i.e. robust realist) and nominalist philosophies of mathematics. Very roughly,
mathematical Platonists hold that mathematical objects (such as numbers or
sets) exist independently of us, our linguistic conventions, our practices, etc.,
whereas mathematical nominalists believe that mathematical objects do not ex-
ist (at least not independently of us, our linguistic conventions, our practices,
etc.). Platonists explain mathematical semantics and ontology in a straight-
forward way (mathematical statements refer to, and are true in virtue of, the
existence of abstract mathematical objects), but have trouble explaining the
epistemology of mathematics (how do we acquire knowledge of those objects,
given that they are abstract, causally inert, and non-spatiotemporal?). Nomi-
nalists, on the other hand, can tell a straightforward story about mathematical
epistemology (we have knowledge of mathematics because we “invented” it as a
language to simplify and systematize cardinality assertions about the physical
6Cf. Bell and Hellman 2006; Feferman et al. 2000
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world), but have a hard time explaining mathematical semantics and ontology
(if there are no mathematical objects, what do mathematical statements refer
to, and what exactly makes them true?).7
Structuralists about mathematics share the nominalist intuition that simply
postulating the existence of mathematical objects is contentious, yet agree with
Platonists that mathematical statements do have objective, non-vacuous, mind-
independent truth-conditions. There are several different forms of mathematical
structuralism,8 but the form that carries least ontological weight is modal struc-
turalism, which was developed by Geoffrey Hellman (1989; 1990). Its core idea
is that, in order to explain (a) why mathematical statements are objectively
true and (b) how we acquire mathematical knowledge, it is not necessary to
commit ourselves ontologically. All that is required is a plausible story about
(and thus, a commitment to) the possibility of the existence of mathematical
structures. The following sections summarize that story.
3.1 Mathematical Ontology
What is the subject matter of mathematics? Platonists believe that it involves
mind-independent abstract objects, each of which has a number of properties
uniquely characterizing its intrinsic nature. Structuralists about mathematics,
on the other hand, argue that mathematicians are in no position to commit
themselves to the existence of such objects. This is not only because it would be
impossible to explain how we acquire knowledge of them, but also because there
are different, mutually exclusive ways of characterizing them, so that the idea
of a unique, intrinsic nature for each mathematical object becomes untenable.
For example, following the work of a group of French mathematicians work-
ing under the pen name ‘Nicolas Bourbaki’,9 it is now widely accepted that all
of mathematics (numbers, relations, functions, theorems) can be reduced to, or
formulated in, the language of set theory. However, it is indeterminate to which
sets exactly, say, the number three reduces: it can be expressed as {{{∅}}}
(this reduction was suggested by Ernst Zermelo) or as {∅, {∅}, {∅, {∅}}} (this
reduction was suggested by John von Neumann). These two different charac-
terizations of the number three are not simply different ways of saying the same
thing—because they have incompatible consequences. For example, von Neu-
mann’s reduction entails that the number one is a member of the number three,
whereas on Zermelo’s reduction, the number one is not a member of the number
three. So every possible choice in characterizing the number three in terms of
a set of sets will entail further, often mutually exclusive conceptual and onto-
logical commitments. Consequently, the choice between different set-theoretic
characterizations of the number three is far from trivial.10 And since we don’t
know of any way to settle the question of which sets ‘lie at the foundation’ or
uniquely characterize the number three, the mathematical Platonist who wishes
7Benacerraf (1973) was the first to explicitly formulate this trade-off between Platonism
and nominalism.
8For an overview of their main differences, see, for example, Reck and Price 2000 and
Hellman 2005.
9See, for example, N. Bourbaki. 2004. Elements of Mathematics I: Theory of Sets. Berlin:
Springer.
10This problem, now known as the Identification Problem, was first formulated by Paul
Benacerraf (1965).
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to argue for the existence of uniquely characterizable mathematical objects is
left with a seemingly insurmountable problem.
Note the similarity of this case of mathematical disagreement to some of the
classical disagreements between theists: should we comprehend God as uniper-
sonal (as Jews believe) or triune (as Christians believe)? Defenders of both
views are convinced to have good reasons for their view, yet God cannot be
both unipersonal and triune at the same time. Similarly, while traditional the-
ists believe that God intervenes in the human world, deists believe that God does
not intervene—and of course, both claims cannot be true at the same time. In
the absence of agreement on such problems, it is indeterminate which attributes
‘lie at the foundation’ or uniquely characterize God—a serious problem for the
theist who wishes to argue for the existence of a uniquely characterizable God.
Back to mathematics. Mathematical structuralists hold that, in light of such
problems of indeterminacy, it is pointless to continue puzzling about unique
characterizations for mathematical objects in terms of other mathematical ob-
jects. Rather, the mathematical structuralist argues, we should focus on the
relations that hold between mathematical objects, and use those for an implicit
characterization of mathematical objects.
Let’s stick to the example of the natural numbers. Instead of wondering
what the correct set-theoretic reduction of the number three is, mathematical
structuralists suggest that we focus on the properties of the natural-number-
structure, i.e. “the pattern common to any infinite collection of objects that
has a successor relation, a unique initial object, and satisfies the induction
principle” (Shapiro 2000: 258). On this view, the subject matter of arithmetic
is not a collection of mathematical objects (the natural numbers), but a single
abstract structure, call it SN , with the following properties:
1. SN has a unique initial object,
2. all objects in SN have a unique successor, and
3. all objects in SN satisfy the induction principle, such that, if a statement
p is true of n, then it is also true of n+1.
On this characterization of the natural-number-structure, the number three
is thus implicitly defined as the third position within that structure.
Compare this way of thinking about mathematics to the way in which we
understand a game like chess. It is true that each chess piece has a particular
shape: the king has a little cross on its top, the queen a little crown, each pawn
a little sphere, etc. However, when we play chess, we abstract from the partic-
ular features of the pieces and focus solely on those that matter for the game,
namely, the possible moves each piece can make on the chessboard in relation
to the other pieces. In this sense, the game of chess is fully determined by its
‘structure’, which consists in (all configurations of) the spatial and ‘possible
moves’ relationships that obtain between the pieces. The intrinsic features of
the chess pieces themselves, on the other hand, (their material, shape, or colour)
are completely irrelevant for the game—the pieces are mere reference points for
the spatial and ‘possible moves’ relations.11
11The chess analogy is Shapiro’s (2000: 260ff).
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In the same way, the mathematical structuralist argues, the subject matter
of mathematics is not determined by mathematical objects with intrinsic prop-
erties, but by a network of relations holding between mere positions, or points
of reference, thus constituting a manifold of different structures. This view does
not only sidestep difficult questions about the ontology of mathematical objects
by focusing solely on the relations that hold between them. It also reflects a
crucial fact about mathematical practice, viz. that mathematical progress con-
sists in discovering new interrelations between, and not new intrinsic features
of, mathematical objects.
3.2 Mathematical Semantics
The second question for the mathematical structuralist concerns semantics: do
mathematical statements have definite truth-values, and if so, what is it that
makes mathematical statements true? Clearly, the mathematical structuralist
cannot hold that mathematical statements like ‘2+2=4’ are made true by any-
thing like Platonic mathematical objects—reference to Platonic objects whose
identity and existence are difficult or even impossible to determine, and knowl-
edge of which seems inexplicable on a realist picture, is precisely what the struc-
turalist wants to avoid. Rather, the structuralist provides a modal semantics
for mathematical statements, i.e. a way of explaining the truth of mathematical
statements purely in terms of logical possibility.
Take, for example, any arithmetical statement A, such as ‘2+2=4’. The
structures constituting the subject matter of arithmetical statements are pro-
gressions (what the mathematician calls ‘ω-sequences’). The modal structuralist
‘translation’ of a statement like ‘2+2=4’ has two parts. The first part is hypo-
thetical: it says that, if there were a structure SN satisfying the natural-number-
requirements12, then A would hold in SN (Hellman 1989: 16ff). The second
part of the modal-structuralist interpretation of A is categorical: it asserts that
it is logically possible for there to be structures satisfying the natural-number-
requirements (Hellman 1989: 24ff). Slightly more formally, the two components
of the modal-structuralist interpretation of a simple arithmetical sentence A
consists of the following two parts:
Hypothetical: ∀ SN (SN is a structure satisfying the natural-number-re-
quirements → A holds in SN )
Categorical: ♦∃ SN (SN is a structure satisfying the natural-number-require-
ments)
The hypothetical component is relatively innocent: it does nothing but pro-
vide a translation pattern according to which statements in mathematical lan-
guage (in our case: a statement of arithmetic) are converted into statements
12What I call the ‘natural-number-requirements’ here are essentially the axioms of Peano-
arithmetic: 0 ∈ N (‘Zero is a natural number’); n ∈ N ⇒ n′ ∈ N (‘Every natural number n
has a successor n’ which is a natural number’); n ∈ N⇒ n′ 6= 0 (‘Zero is not the successor of
a natural number’); m, n ∈ N⇒ (m′ = n′ ⇒ m = n) (‘Natural numbers which have the same
successor are identical’); 0 ∈ X ∧ ∀n ∈ N : (n ∈ X ⇒ n′ ∈ X) ⇒ N ⊆ X (‘If X contains the
number zero, and with every natural number n also its successor n’, then the natural numbers
are a subset of X’).
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of second-order modal logic.13 The categorical component, however, is less in-
nocent: it asserts the logical possibility of the relevant structures (in our case:
the natural-number structure).14 To be justified, this assertion must be derived
from uncontroversial facts, and the way Hellman achieves this is by inviting us
to imagine any kind of mark, for example a brush stroke, plus a constructive
rule for generating infinitely many ‘next marks’:
“Let ‘A(x,y)’ mean ‘y is generated after x in accordance with rule R’,
and consider the sentence, ∃x∃yA(x, y) & ‘A is asymmetric and tran-
sitive’ & ∀x∃yA(x, y) & ∀x∃!y(A(x, y) & ¬∃z(A(x, y)&A(z, y))....
Now this may not in fact hold in the real world, but I can see no
reason why it should not be logically possible (much as classical
Newtonian models of infinitely extended space or time are possi-
ble).” (Hellman 1990: 317)
In other words, Hellman argues that it is physically (and thus logically)
possible for there to be an initial brush stroke plus a rule for creating additional
brush strokes, and that it is logically possible to apply this rule an infinite
number of times, thus creating an infinite sequence of brush strokes. But if an
infinite sequence of brush strokes is logically possible, then (given that an infinite
sequence of brush strokes exemplifies the natural-number structure) the natural-
number structure is also logically possible—just like the categorical component
asserts.
The modal-structural interpretation of a mathematical statement like ‘2+2=4’
thus involves no commitment to the actual existence of mathematical structures,
but only to their logical possibility. The modal structuralist has thus presented
a semantics for mathematical statements that comes at no ontological cost,
yet preserves what the mathematician is most concerned about, namely objec-
tive truth-values for mathematical statements. Note that the modal-structural
translation scheme nevertheless involves no explicit rejection of mathematical
ontology: for all that has been said, mathematical objects might in fact exist.
Modal structuralism is thus a position that avoids interpreting mathematics
in ontologically committal terms, but that clearly embraces truth-value real-
ism for mathematical discourse. As such, it is a position that is silent on, but
fully compatible with, ontological commitment. We can think of the modal
structuralist as someone who sidesteps questions of ontology by extracting the
nominalistic (i.e. ontologically neutral) content from mathematical assertions
in order to provide a minimal semantics for mathematical discourse. The in-
troduction of modal operators preserves verbal agreement with the Platonist
and thus, enables a meaningful exchange between Platonists and nominalists.
This is an important point to note with regard to the following sections, where
we will investigate the possibility of providing a modal-structuralist translation
scheme for theistic assertions.
13I say ‘relatively’ innocent because not everyone considers second-order (modal) logic on-
tologically innocent, given that it seems to imply a commitment to universals.
14Without the categorical component, modal structuralism would be indistinguishable from
ordinary ‘if-then-ism’, or fictionalism, about mathematics, and would inherit the latter’s ma-
jor problem of vacuous truth. Just like ‘if-then-ism’ about mathematical objects renders all
mathematical sentences true if in fact no mathematical objects exist—because conditionals
with false antecedents (F→ T) are always vacuously true—, a modal ‘if-then-ism’ about math-
ematical structures would render all mathematical sentences true if the relevant mathematical
structures are impossible (cf. Hellman 1990: 316).
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3.3 Mathematical Knowledge
Finally, a modal-structural interpretation of mathematical statements offers a
straightforward explanation of how we acquire knowledge of mathematical struc-
tures: (i) we perceive objects or constellations in the concrete world that ex-
emplify a portion of the natural-number-structure (for example, a sequence of
brush strokes or a line of trinkets in a row); (ii) we then abstract from the in-
trinsic features of the brush strokes or trinkets and zoom in on the structural
relations holding between them; finally, (iii) we generalize these relations into
a purely structural picture. In this way, our knowledge of mathematical struc-
tures is a direct consequence of our perception of concrete structured objects and
constellations in the physical world, combined with our ability to abstract from
particular intrinsic features and to generalize structural relations. Take again
the number three for example. Given that the natural-number-structure is ex-
emplified by countless collections in the physical world—for example sequences
of brush strokes or trinkets—the mathematical structuralist has no difficulty
explaining how we come to have knowledge of the natural-number-structure
and specific ‘positions’ in that structure: we perceive instances of it everywhere
around us. Consequently, we also perceive instances of the third position of the
natural number structure, which we commonly refer to as the number three.
Let’s now turn to see whether we can construct a structuralist picture of theism
that is equally philosophically advantageous.
4 A Structuralist View of Theism
What does all of this mathematical talk have to do with theism? Just like it is
nonsense, from the structuralist point of view, to consider a mathematical ob-
ject like the number three in isolation from its relations to other mathematical
objects, it is, I submit, nonsensical to think of God in isolation from God’s rela-
tions to the world and all other beings. A modal structuralist account of theism
accommodates the atheist’s intuition that simply postulating the existence of a
supreme yet imperceptible, causally inert being is philosophically contentious.
At the same time, my account provides a way to substantiate the theist’s con-
viction that theistic statements have objective, non-vacuous, mind-independent
truth-conditions under which the assertion that God exists is true.
Consider again the chess analogy: can we meaningfully imagine a chess piece,
for example one that plays the role of a rook, independently of a chess game?
No, we cannot. This is because, in the absence of other pieces, a chessboard,
and two players, we wouldn’t know how to think about its moves, its position,
etc. In other words, we can only comprehend a chess piece like the rook in
conjunction with all other constituents of the game, just like we can only under-
stand the number three in relation to the rest of the natural-numbers-structure.
A structuralist view of theism formulates the exact same intuition for the case
of God.
4.1 Theistic Ontology
What is the subject matter of theology? God, of course. However, it is not at
all clear what we mean by that term. For example, theists disagree strongly on
which properties exactly characterize God’s nature (is God omnipotent? simple?
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immutable?), and indeed, on whether God can be analyzed in terms of necessary
and sufficient conditions at all. 15
The view I propose acknowledges such disputes as potentially unresolvable.
Instead of demanding ontological commitment to a supreme being whose nature
can, and has been, defined in a number of mutually exclusive ways, structuralist
theists suggest that we focus on the structure of theism—the structure composed
of the relations in which we stand to God. My account thus aims to be a response
to the question what God is for us, rather than to the question what God is in
essence.
Focusing on the relations between God and its creatures rather than on def-
initional aspects not only avoids problems of indeterminacy, but also reflects
the fact that it is in virtue of those relations rather than in virtue of definitions
that most theists initially come to believe in God. For instance, many theists
would agree that love, contemplation, and prayer are prime examples for rela-
tions rooted in, and therefore leading to, God. Others consider awe, submission,
and even fear to be the characteristic features of their relationship with God.
And yet others think that it is primarily through joy, gratefulness, and praise
that we relate to God.
Every theist thus has her own, individual relationship with God. However,
there are three basic relations that are arguably implicit in all of them. It is
these three relations that, according to my account, implicitly define theism.
The first one captures the fact that all religious concepts defining a theist’s life
derive from the assumption of there being a God in the first place. For example,
an action cannot be sinful without there being a God who defines which actions
constitute sins. This is to say that, before there can be any theistic concept at
all, there must be God. Without God, religious concepts are meaningless. Let’s
call this very basic relation the relation of logical priority : God is logically prior
to all theistic, and possibly to all religious concepts that determine a theist’s
beliefs and actions. The second basic relation captures the fact that all religious
concepts defining a theist’s life derive from the assumption that God’s existence
is fundamental to all other objects and beings, whose existence is consequently
dependent on and grounded in God’s existence. Let’s call this the relation of
metaphysical priority : God is metaphysically prior to all creatures. This relation
is implicit in the story of creation; in characterizations of God as all-powerful; in
the belief that God resurrects the dead; in principles concerning the right way
to worship God and to live one’s life, etc. It is arguably also a relation in which
further relations such as awe and submission, love and contemplation are rooted.
The third basic relation that arguably characterizes every theist’s relationship
with God is that God’s knowledge is superior to the knowledge of every other
being. In particular, God knows everything that every being thinks and does at
all times, so that it is not possible to ever think or do something without God
15Already Aquinas (Summa Theologiae, 1a, 3-11) and Maimonides (Guide for the Perplexed,
1.51) were sceptical of the idea that God’s nature can be captured in terms of a list of divine
attributes, and a number of contemporary philosophers of religion defend related viewpoints.
Howard Wettstein (2012), for example, argues that the focus of contemporary philosophy of
religion on conceptual analysis ignores and thus obscures the fact that religious scriptures tend
to promote a purely affective, emotion-based approach to religious practice, not a commitment
to firm metaphysical beliefs. Relatedly, Fiona Ellis (2017) rejects a philosophy of religion
based entirely on conceptual analysis, and suggest a praxis-oriented approach that reflects
the reality of religious life rather than obsessing over necessary and sufficient conditions for
religious concepts. See also Kyle Scott’s contribution to this volume.
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knowing it. Let’s call this relation between God and all other beings the relation
of epistemic superiority : God is epistemically superior to all creatures. This
relation is implicit in all principles of religious ethics and morality (which are
grounded in the belief that God know who acts right and who acts wrong), most
notably in in the belief that God rewards the righteous and punishes evildoers.
As indicated above, there are certainly many more relations that characterize
a theist’s relationship with God, but these are arguably the three fundamental
one’s: the logical and metaphysical priority as well as the epistemic superiority
of God over all other objects, beings, and their actions.
There are certainly many more features that characterize a theist’s relation-
ship with God, but these are, I submit, the three fundamental ones: the logical,
metaphysical, and epistemic priority of God over all other objects, beings, and
their actions.
Now, just as in the case of numbers and in the case of chess, we can picture
the structure of theism as determined by the relations between a central position,
commonly referred to as ‘God’, and infinitely many other positions (referred to
as beings, objects, etc.). The central position stands in a relation of logical,
metaphysical, and epistemic priority to the all other positions, which, in turn,
stand in countless relations to one another. On this picture, the structure of
theism, call it ST , can be described as follows:
1. ST is a structure holding between infinitely many objects and beings that
stand in relations of logical, metaphysical, and epistemic priority to one
another,
2. ST has a unique, central object G (conventionally referred to as ‘God’),
such that
3. G is logically prior to all objects and beings of ST ,
4. G is metaphysically prior to all objects and beings of ST , and
5. G is epistemically superior (prior) to all objects and beings of ST .
God, on this picture, is implicitly defined as the central point of reference in
the theism-structure, which is in turn defined solely in terms of logical, meta-
physical, and epistemic priority relations. Unlike all other objects and beings,
God is unique in that She is the only being that is prior in all three respects to
all other objects and beings.
Again, we can compare this way of thinking to the way in which we under-
stand a game of chess and the roles of each chess piece. Just like we do not need
to know anything about the intrinsic features of the chess pieces (their mate-
rial, colour, or shape) in order to understand their role in the game and their
meaning for one another, we do not need to know anything about the intrinsic
features of God in order to understand Her role as the central point of reference
in the theism structure, and Her meaning for all other ‘positions’, occupied by
other beings, in this structure. God is thus fully determined by the structure
of theism, which consists in (all configurations of) the logical, metaphysical,
and epistemic priority relationships that hold between the central position of
the structure, and all other positions. The intrinsic features of God (and conse-
quently, of all other positions in the structure), on the other hand, are irrelevant
in order to understand the structure of theism—as is the question whether or
not god has any intrinsic features at all.
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4.2 Theistic Semantics
Just like in the case of mathematical realism, also in the case of theism there
is one question that has particular importance: do theistic statements have
objective truth-values, and if so, what is it that makes theistic statements true?
Recall that the preservation of objective truth-values is crucial for all theists who
want to avoid non-cognitivist, error-theoretic, or subjectivist interpretations of
theistic assertions. The commitment to objective truth-values is thus essential
for the theist. Consequently, the central question becomes: what is it that
makes theistic statements true?
Clearly, the structuralist theist cannot hold that a theistic statement like
‘God is omniscient’ is made true by a uniquely characterizable object God—
reference to such an object whose identity and existence are difficult or even
impossible to determine, and knowledge of which can seem inexplicable on a
realist picture, is precisely what the structuralist theist wants to avoid. Rather,
the structuralist theist can provide a modal semantics for theistic statements,
i.e. a way of explaining the truth of theistic statements purely in terms of logical
possibility.
Take, for example, a theistic statement T, such as ‘God is omniscient’. Just
like in the case of mathematics, the modal-structuralist ‘translation’ of this
statement has two parts. The first part is hypothetical. It says that, if there
were a structure ST satisfying the theism-requirements, then T would hold in
ST . The second part is the categorical component of the modal-structuralist
interpretation. It asserts that it is logically possible for there to be a structure
satisfying the theism-requirements. Slightly more formally, the two components
of the modal-structuralist interpretation of a theistic assertion like T are:
Hypothetical: ∀ ST (ST is a structure satisfying the theism-requirements
→ T holds in ST )
Categorical: ♦∃ ST (ST is a structure satisfying the theism-requirements)
The hypothetical component is metaphysically innocent: all it does is provide
a translation pattern according to which statements in theistic language (in this
case: a statement about God’s omniscience) are converted into statements of
second-order modal logic. As in the mathematical case, it is the categorical
component that involves a substantial assertion. viz. the logical possibility
of the structure in question. And just as in the case of mathematics, this
categorical assertion must be derived from uncontroversial facts in order to be
justified. What are these uncontroversial facts?
Recall that Hellman derives the logical possibility of the natural number
structure from the physical possibility of there being an infinitely extendible
series of brush strokes, generated by a repeated application of a constructive rule
to an initial brush stroke. Put differently, Hellman argues that it is physically
(and thus logically) possible for there to be an initial brush stroke plus a rule
for creating additional brush strokes, and that it is logically possible to apply
this rule an infinite number of times, thus creating an infinite sequence of brush
strokes instantiating the natural-number structure.
Also in the case of theism, we can derive the logical possibility of a structure
satisfying the theism requirements from uncontroversial facts about the physical
world, combined with uncontroversial facts about counterfactual reasoning. We
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begin with the assertion that it is physically possible for there to be a being
that is logically, metaphysically, and epistemically prior to another being in the
sense described above. One example for this is the relation between mother
and child. The concept of a child implies the concept of a mother; hence, the
concept of a mother is logically prior to the concept of a child. Moreover, the
existence of a mother is fundamental to the existence of a child, whose existence
is, in turn, dependent on, or grounded in, her mother’s existence. The mother
is thus metaphysically prior to the child. Finally, at least up to a certain age,
a mother’s knowledge is clearly superior to that of her child; hence, she is
epistemically superior to her child.
From the physical possibility of the mother-child structure, which is deter-
mined by relations of logical, metaphysical, and epistemic priority, we can infer
the metaphysical possibility of a being that is logically, metaphysically, and
epistemically priori to all beings in the physical world. How can we do that?
Generally speaking, we are justified in asserting the metaphysical possibility of
an object, being, or event just in case a counterfactual derivation of the assump-
tion that this object, being, or event is possible does not yield a contradiction.16
The assumption of there existing a being that is logically, metaphysically, and
epistemically prior to all other objects and beings does not yield a contradic-
tion. Therefore, we are justified in asserting the metaphysical possibility of such
a being, which, in turn, entails the logical possibility of this being. But if the
existence of such a being is possible, then (given that the conjunction of this
being and all other objects and beings exemplifies the theism structure) the
theism structure is also logically possible—just like the categorical component
asserts.
Note that this translation scheme of a sentence like ‘God is omniscient’
involves no commitment to the actual existence of the theism structure, but
only to its logical possibility. Nevertheless, it involves no explicit rejection of
theistic ontology: for all that has been said, God might exist. The modal
structuralist has thus presented a semantics for theistic statements that comes
at no ontological cost, yet preserves what the theist is most concerned about,
namely objective truth-values for theistic statements.
Modal structuralism about theism is thus a position that avoids interpreting
theism in ontologically committal terms, but that clearly embraces truth-value
realism for theistic discourse. As such, it is a position that is silent on, but fully
compatible with, ontological commitment to God. We can think of the modal
structuralist theist as someone who sidesteps questions of ontology and extracts
the nominalistic (i.e. ontologically neutral) content from theistic assertions, in
order to provide a minimal semantics for theistic discourse. The introduction
of modal operators preserves verbal agreement with the traditional theist and
thus, enables a meaningful exchange between theists and atheists. By focusing
on the nominalistic content of theistic assertions only, modal structuralism about
theism thus vindicates theistic belief by making it a rationally defeasible option.
It takes seriously both the concerns of the theist (by honouring the importance
of providing definite truth-values for theistic statements) and the concerns of the
atheist (by honouring the importance to refrain from ontological commitments).
16For a detailed discussion of the way in which we generate knowledge of metaphysical
modality, see Williamson 2007: 134ff.
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4.3 Theistic Knowledge
Finally, just like in the case of mathematics, the advantage of characterizing
God and theism in structuralist terms is not only that it avoids problems of
indeterminacy by avoiding questions of ontology throughout. It also offers a
straightforward explanation of how we acquire knowledge of the theism struc-
ture.
In the first step, we perceive constellations of beings in the concrete world
that exemplify a portion of the theism structure ST. Recall the example of
mother and child. The mother stands in a relation of logical and metaphys-
ical priority, and epistemic superiority to her child. Thus, mother and child
exemplify the theism structure. However, they exemplify it only partly. This is
because, unlike God, the mother is not logically, metaphysically, and epistemi-
cally prior/ superior to all other beings. The theism-structure is thus only par-
tially instantiated. Again, compare this case to the case of the natural numbers.
The natural-number structure is exemplified by countless collections of objects
(such as a sequence of trinkets in a row). However, the natural-number struc-
ture is only ever partially instantiated. After all, the natural-number structure
is infinite, whereas no collection of objects in the physical world is. Hence, the
natural-number structure can only ever be exemplified partially in the physical
world.
However, these partial instantiations suffice to give us knowledge of the struc-
ture in its entirety. How so? In the second step, we abstract from the intrinsic
features of the specific mother-and-child example, focusing only on the struc-
tural relations holding between them. In other words, we zoom in on the rela-
tions that hold between mother and child, while at the same time ignoring the
two specific beings (‘objects’) instantiating these relations. We focus thus our
attention solely on the set of the three relations: logical priority, metaphysical
priority, epistemic superiority.
In the third step, we then generalize these relations into a purely structural
picture of logical, metaphysical, and epistemic priority relations. From this
purely structural picture, we finally derive the logical possibility of there being a
constellation exemplifying the theism-structure in its entirety, i.e. of there being
a structure with one central object, God, standing in logical, metaphysical, and
epistemic priority/ superiority relations to all other objects and beings in the
structure—the full structure of theism.
To sum up: just as we acquire knowledge of the natural-number structure
by perceiving partial instantiations (e.g. sequences of brush strokes) of that
structure in the physical world, and by generalizing that structure into a full
picture of the structure, we acquire knowledge of the theism structure by per-
ceiving partial instantiations of it (e.g. mother-child-relations) in the physical
world, and by generalizing it into a full picture of the structure.17 On this view,
our knowledge of the logical possibility of the theism structure is thus a direct
consequence of (1) our perception of constellations of physical objects or beings
standing in logical, metaphysical, and epistemic priority/ superiority relations
to one another, (2) our ability to abstract from particular objects or beings
instantiating that structure, and to generalize structural relations, and (3) our
17Note that the partial instantiations of the theism-structure we perceive in the physical
world also inform our way of talking about God: we refer to God as a ‘father’ or ‘mother’, to
human beings as God’s ‘children’, etc.).
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ability to derive, from uncontroversial assumptions, the logical possibility of
there being a constellation exemplifying this structure.
5 Conclusion
This way of characterizing theism may seem very unconventional—perhaps too
unconventional for a traditional theist who believes in God as uniquely char-
acterized by traditional divine attributes such as omniscience, omnipotence,
omnipresence, etc. However, it really is nothing but a formalized description
of what I take to be the core of many religious people’s beliefs: the experi-
ence of themselves as standing in a relationship to a being whose nature cannot
be grasped conceptually, but whose relation to themselves is perfectly clear.
The reason we may not be able to understand God’s nature while at the same
time having no doubt about our relationship to God is that, as constituents of
this relation, we experience it first-hand and thereby generate an immediate,
phenomenal knowledge of what it is like to stand in such a relation. We can
illustrate this point by returning to the example of mother and child, who stand
in relations of logical, metaphysical, and epistemic priority. While the child
does probably not know everything about the nature of its mother (much less
about the correct conceptual analysis of the concept ‘mother’ or ‘motherhood’),
it does understand the nature of its relation to its mother perfectly because it
is a constituent of this relationship and thus, experiences it first-hand.
Just like we can say many more things with certainty about the way in
which numbers relate to each other than we can say about the intrinsic nature
of numbers, there are many more things we can say with certainty about the way
in which we relate to God than we can say about the nature of God. Structuralist
theism accommodates this fact by offering an interpretation of theistic assertions
in terms of the logical possibility of structural relations between beings.
Consider further that nothing in this view prevents the theists from ascribing
those properties to God in addition to the structuralist view. A structuralist
view of theism extracts the shareable, nominalistic content from theistic asser-
tions through its modal structuralist translation schema, and thus provides a
minimal semantics for discourse about God. The introduction of modal opera-
tors preserves verbal agreement with the atheist and thus, enables a meaningful
exchange between theists and atheists on the subject matter of the possibility
of God and theism. This is already much more than what is granted by most
scientific naturalists, who are convinced that science holds the “monopoly on
reality and explanation”18, and that theistic belief is consequently untenable.19
A structuralist view of theism demonstrates the rational viability of theism
in purely naturalistic terms. It does not offer a anything beyond that. In
particular, it does not offer an argument for the existence of God. However, as
the history of philosophy shows, it is not clear that God’s existence could ever
be proved or disproved by means of an argument. While traditional theists may
find this view unacceptably deflated, it does achieve the goal of rendering theism
18Fiona Ellis, ‘Religious Understanding and Theory’
19Note the similarity of this line of argument to the familiar Quinean view that we should
be ontologically committed to all and only entities quantification over which is indispensable
to our best scientific theories—the implication being, of course, that both the ‘entity’ God and
truths about this entity are dispensable to the scientific project of explaining the phenomena
of the world.
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compatible with naturalism. And perhaps showing that theism is possibly true
is not as modest a result as it may first seem. To put it in Peter De Vries words,
“It is the final proof of God’s omnipotence that he need not exist in order to
save us.” 20
Word count including references and bibliography: 7,100.
20Peter De Vries, The Mackarel Plaza, 1958
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